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Abstract 
Trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable to other agents’ actions as well as an assessment of 
these agents’ trustworthiness. This paper seeks to unpack the relationship between trust and 
workplace organization, focusing on signals of (un)trustworthiness guiding employers’ trust 
decisions. While much research finds that societal trust norms affect workplace organization, 
particularly the granting of autonomy to employees, the underlying process remains essentially a 
black box. Integrating extant literatures, I posit that employers use group-level traits to infer 
(un)trustworthiness and decide on how much job autonomy to grant to specific employees. I test 
this prediction in a large cross-national sample comprising migrant employees originating from 
home countries that differ in the degree to which corruption has been institutionalized in society. 
Confirming my prediction, empirical results reveal a strong negative relationship between home-
country corruption and job autonomy. Results are robust to controlling for a range of potential 
confounders, including personal income and home-country level of economic development as 
proxies for unobserved skill differentials. Key contribution of the paper is to reveal important 
real-world features of trust governing exchange in the context of workplace organization. 
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The role of trust in governing workplace organization is widely recognized (Arrow 1974; 
Granovetter 1985). Fukuyama (1995: 31), for instance, finds that trust fosters flexibility in the 
workplace and the assigning of greater responsibility at lower levels of the organization. 
Moreover, by now, there are several empirical studies linking societal differences in trust norms 
to average firm size and, particularly, the granting of autonomy to employees (Akcigit et al. 
2016; Bloom et al. 2012; La Porta et al. 1997). However, insight on deeper processes that play a 
role in the link between trust and key features of workplace organization such as job autonomy 
remains lacking. 
This paper seeks to unpack the black box of trust governing exchange in the context of 
workplace organization, specifically the decision of how much autonomy to grant to employees. 
In market settings, trust is understood to involve both a willingness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of the other party and an assessment of the counterparty’s trustworthiness (Arrow 1972; 
Granovetter 1985; North 1990). Not all (potential) exchange partners are equally trustworthy and 
drawing on a variety of signals allows actors to make an informed assessment of the risk of 
transacting with a particular party (Coleman 1990; Gambetta and Hill 2005; Hardin 2002). In 
workplace settings, principals that outsource tasks to agents are similarly vulnerable to agents’ 
actions. In general, decentralization and outsourcing of tasks are desirable for efficiency reasons. 
Trust issues, however, prevent principals from simply granting complete autonomy to their 
agents and reap the full benefits of specialization through the division of labor. Hence, an 
essential decision in workplace organization is for employers to differentiate between those 
employees that they can trust more and offer higher degrees of job autonomy to and those 
employees that they can trust less and need to monitor and control more closely. The concrete 
aim of this paper is to uncover some specifics of the process and factors guiding employers to 
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decide on how much autonomy to grant to different employees. 
The literature with most relevance to this issue involves studies that consider employers 
differentiating between employees in the context of recruitment decisions. Key insights from this 
literature concern the role of signaling (Spence 1974) and statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; 
Phelps 1972). Faced with limited information by which to judge potential employees, employers 
rely on employee signals as well as other observable characteristics to make rational inferences 
about underlying intangible traits and dispositions (Altonji and Pierret 2001). Oft-mentioned 
signals or observables are educational credentials but also membership to a particular social 
group, for example, blacks versus whites.1 Also relevant is the literature on trust in game 
experiments, specifically studies of the effect of (unintentional) signals on the amount of trust 
that an individual trustor places in certain trustees. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), for instance, 
report that among two groups of Israeli Jews, those from European and American descent were 
trusted more than their fellow citizens from Asian and African descent were. Other work finds 
that even a simple signal such as counterparties’ physical appearance can affect trustors’ 
behavior in experimental trust games (Eckel and Petrie 2011; Van ’t Wout and Sanfey 2008). 
Finally, McEvily et al. (2012) found evidence indicating that laboratory trust decisions were 
shaped by trustors’ perceptions of trustees, which, in turn, were based on observable background 
characteristics. 
Following the above body of research, the specific feature of the trust-autonomy nexus 
                                                 
1
 Strictly speaking, we may distinguish between intentional signals consciously sent by 
prospective employees and unintentional signals or informational cues as derived by employers 
from observable characteristics of employees. This distinction is not material to the analysis in 
the present paper, however. 
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considered in this paper is how group-level traits, as emphasized by theories of statistical 
discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972), go on to generate job autonomy differentials between 
individuals belonging to different social groups. My expectation is that employers use group-
level traits as a signal of (un)trustworthiness and are more/less willing to grant autonomy to 
workers belonging to social groups with positive/negative images concerning honesty and 
reliability. Trustworthiness is often considered in terms of reputation building and repeated 
interactions that allow trust between two parties to develop over time (Dasgupta 1988; 
Granovetter 1985). My interest is not in specifics of the relationship between selected principals 
and agents, however, but in broad patterns of job autonomy differentials that testify to the 
process and factors that guide employers’ decisions of how much autonomy to grant to specific 
employees. 
Reflective of this interest, the chosen research context for my analysis is a cross-national 
sample of immigrants, which is close to ideal for studying broad patterns of job autonomy as a 
real-world outcome variable instead of individual-specific autonomy decisions. As outsiders in 
their host country, migrants appear especially vulnerable to stereotypes and differential treatment 
based on statistical inferences, as also shown in the large literature on ethnic discrimination in 
recruitment decisions (see Lang and Lehmann 2012 for a survey). Moreover, certain traits of 
migrants’ home countries can be quite salient, making it possible for employers to rely on these 
traits when offering differential treatment to members of different social groups on the basis of 
inferred trustworthiness. The specific hypothesis that I test is that the degree to which corruption 
is institutionalized in a migrant’s home country has a negative effect on his/her level of job 
autonomy. The argument is that the level of corruption in the home country affects an 
individual’s job autonomy because employers take an individual’s association with corruption as 
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a signal of his/her trustworthiness. The sample that I use comprises 9,150 migrants from 157 
home countries currently residing in a set of 32 mostly European countries. The empirical 
analysis provides strong support for my hypothesis, indicating a strong negative relationship 
between home-country corruption and job autonomy. An extensive set of robustness checks 
provides further confirmation of the idea that home-country corruption is taken as a signal of 
individuals’ trustworthiness and ends up affecting how much job autonomy migrant employees 
from different home countries have in their host countries. 
The key contribution of this paper is to present real-world evidence on an important 
feature underlying the process of trust governing exchange in the context of workplace 
organization. In doing so, this paper helps extend and bring together a set of disparate literatures. 
While employers’ reliance on employee signals and statistical inferences when making 
employment decisions is widely recognized, these decisions are typically limited to recruitment 
and selection. Moving beyond initial recruitment decisions, this paper shows the relevance of 
signaling and statistical discrimination also in the post-recruitment managerial treatment of 
distinct groups of employees. Similarly, while prior research has found that various traits of the 
counterparty can affect an individual’s trusting behavior, this evidence remains limited to 
decisions made in laboratory settings. This paper, in contrast, has sought to move beyond 
individual trust decisions to consider how employers’ consideration of signals of 
(un)trustworthiness pans out in the real world, giving rise to systematic patterns of job autonomy 
differentials between individuals from different ethno-national backgrounds. Finally, though not 
the main concern of the present paper, the evidence of the effect of home-country corruption on 
individuals’ managerial treatment testifies to the importance of statistical discrimination for the 
extent to which individual migrants are able to integrate successfully in the workplace. As home-
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country traits are strictly beyond individuals’ control, how a migrant’s home country scores on 
various traits may be one of the most significant barriers that a migrant faces in achieving 
professional success in his/her host country. 
 
I. Theoretical Background and Empirical Approach 
A. Job Autonomy and Signals of Trustworthiness 
This paper’s interest in job autonomy as a key feature of workplace organization 
resonates with the long-standing literature relating the organization of the workplace to possible 
efficiency gains due to comparative advantage that traces back to Adam Smith’s famous pin 
factory. A straightforward definition of job autonomy is as “the condition or quality of being 
self-governing or free from excessive external control” (Jermier and Michaels 2001: 1006). 
When it comes to job autonomy, the ultimate challenge that employers face in deciding how 
much autonomy to grant to different employees is to strike a balance between the costs and 
benefits of different amounts of autonomy versus the intensity of monitoring and control. 
Monitoring and control thereby have direct costs in terms of taking up some of the firms’ 
resources, for instance, managerial attention. More importantly, however, there is an essential 
connection between the costs and benefits of control on the one hand and the costs and benefits 
of autonomy on the other. 
The classic understanding of the specialization benefits of employee autonomy comprises 
two elements. The first is that employees are specialists that have gained unique knowledge on 
how to perform their production tasks most efficiently. The second is that the specific knowledge 
or skills that employees have accumulated are typically tacit (or at least only partly codifiable) so 
that leveraging this knowledge requires that employees are granted freedom to perform their job 
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in the way they deem best. As non-specialists, managers or employers should refrain from 
prescribing employees how they should do their job, as the former’s lack of relevant knowledge 
results in a production process that is less efficient than a production process that is organized by 
specialist employees themselves. Part of the costs of monitoring and control is thus that they 
prevent the reaping of efficiency gains from specialization. In contrast, the costs of autonomy are 
that lack of monitoring and control gives employees more opportunity to shirk. If employees 
have complete autonomy, there is no formal mechanism that ensures that employees act in the 
best interest of their employer or prevents employees from pursuing their own interests at the 
expense of their employers’ interest. The benefits of monitoring and control are that they help 
reduce employee shirking. 
Trustworthiness matters because it changes the balance between the costs and benefits of 
autonomy versus control. If a principal can trust the agent to look after the principal’s interests 
and not to shirk, there is simply less need for monitoring and control so that autonomy can 
increase, allowing for more efficiency gains from specialization. Vice versa, the costs of 
autonomy are higher—and, hence, the gains from control higher—in case an employee cannot be 
relied upon to work diligently, absent any formal mechanism for ensuring cooperation. The 
degree to which specific employees are honest and can be relied upon is not typically known to 
an employer, however. Trustworthiness is a characteristically unobservable trait, meaning that 
employers need to rely on signals or information from group-level traits to make inferences 
about employees’ trustworthiness (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972; Spence 1974). These inferences 
result in differentiation between employees and are taken into account in the decision of how 
much autonomy to grant to specific employees. In practice, there can be many signals or traits 
that employers can draw on to infer trustworthiness. Hence, my generic proposition that 
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individuals recognized to belong to social groups with positive/negative images concerning their 
honesty and reliability are deemed more/less trustworthy and have more/less job autonomy. 
 
B. Empirical Approach 
Empirical testing of the above proposition requires a research context that involves 
multiple social groups as well as the possibility of identifying a group-level trait that would 
allow employers to infer differences in trustworthiness and adapt their decision on how much 
autonomy to grant to specific employees accordingly. The chosen research context for my 
empirical analysis is immigrants originating from different birth or home countries. The reason 
for choosing this particular research context is threefold. First, ethno-national background is 
widely recognized as a powerful basis for social categorization, meaning it is common for an 
individual to classify other individuals into distinct social groups delineated by, say, nationality 
or individuals’ country of birth (Barth 1969). Second, it is common for people to hold a 
stereotypical image of particular countries and their inhabitants (Madon et al. 2001; Prothro 
1954; Schneider 2005).2 Finally, the content of such national stereotypes can be traced back to 
specific country characteristics, for which ample secondary data are available, for instance, 
countries’ economic status (Lee and Fiske 2006). 
Following my use of a migrant sample, I operationalize the idea of different social groups 
in terms of individuals’ ethno-national background, specifically their home country. This means 
that the different social groups considered in my empirical analysis coincide with the different 
home countries or countries of birth of the individuals in my sample. More critical to my analysis 
                                                 
2
 For a popular overview of national stereotypes and corresponding graphical illustrations, see, 
for instance, http://www.nationalstereotype.com. 
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is the operationalization of the idea of social groups having more positive or negative images 
concerning their honesty and reliability. As indicated, employers can, in principle, draw on a 
variety of group-level traits when assessing employees. However, when it comes to assessing 
trustworthiness, the degree to which corruption has been institutionalized in an individual’s 
home country would be a most salient trait to base one’s inference on. I therefore expect that 
systematic differences in the level of corruption in migrants’ home countries give rise to 
systematic differences in inferred trustworthiness and thus to clear patterns of job autonomy 
differentials between various migrant groups. Concretely, the empirical analysis below tests the 
following hypothesis: The higher the level of corruption in a migrant’s home country, the less 
job autonomy this migrant has in his/her host country. 
 
II. Data and Method 
Data for my analysis come from the European Social Survey or ESS (Jowell and Central 
Co-ordinating Team 2007), supplemented with cross-country data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators or WGI project (World Bank 2016), among others. The ESS is a bi-
annual survey of nationally representative samples from 32 mostly European countries, as well 
as such countries as Israel, Turkey and Russia. Following my interest in inferences based on 
group-level traits and corresponding research context, I use only a portion of all respondents in 
the ESS, namely those respondents that currently live in a country other than their home country, 
meaning a country other than the country in which they are born. Foreign-borns from a particular 
home country or country of birth living in a particular host country are typically migrants, which 
have been extensively studied using data from the ESS (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Bisin et 
al. 2011). In addition, I do not consider respondents that are self-employed or working for their 
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own (family) business, as these individuals are typically themselves employers rather than 
employees. Finally, I do not consider the subset of individuals that are not living in their birth 
country, but at the same time are living in the birth country of their parents. An example would 
be a child born abroad during an extended holiday. Excluding respondents with missing data on 
the variables considered in the analysis leaves a sample of 9,150 individuals from 157 home 
countries. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for this sample and a selection of variables used 
in the analysis. Table A.1 in the appendix presents an overview of the home countries in the 
sample, sorted by number of respondents. 
 
A. Variables 
Dependent Variable—The dependent variable in my analysis is the amount of autonomy 
an individual experiences at his/her job. As a key feature of workplace organization, much effort 
has been devoted to measuring job autonomy, particularly by business and management scholars. 
The standard approach is to use surveys, asking respondents to rate their own autonomy 
(Breaugh 1985; Hackman and Oldham 1975). I use this standard approach, which has the 
advantage of eliciting a broad assessment that transcends externally coded specifics of 
employees’ responsibilities or decision rights in narrow operational domains. The wording of the 
job autonomy item included in the ESS is as follows: “Please say how much the management at 
your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own daily work is/was organised?” And the 
accompanying answering scale ranges from 0 (“I have/had no influence”) to 10 (“I have/had 
complete control”). To keep things simple and facilitate interpretation of the results, for my main 
analyses, I assume that job autonomy is measured on a cardinal scale. However, as a robustness 
check I also present results obtained using ordered probit estimation. Importantly, subjective job 
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autonomy indicators of the type included in the ESS, and the ESS survey item in particular, have 
been widely validated (Breaugh 1985; Morgeson and Humphrey 2006; Van Hoorn 2014). Table 
A.2 in the appendix presents some further stylized evidence on the construct validity of the ESS 
job autonomy item, particularly on the relationship between measured job autonomy and other 
features of an individual’s job. If the ESS job autonomy measure is valid, we expect, for 
instance, a positive relation between the non-routineness of work and job autonomy and clear 
differences in job autonomy between the self-employed and ordinary employees, which is 
confirmed by the evidence. To test the robustness of my results, I also consider an alternative 
indicator that is closely related to my main indicator but more narrowly focused on one specific 
feature of job autonomy. The item used to measure this alternative indicator asks respondents to 
describe their current job, specifically whether they can decide the time at which they start and 
finish work. The item includes four possible answer categories: 1, Not at all true; 2, A little true; 
3, Quite true; and 4, Very true. As this item has only been included in Waves 2 and 5 of the ESS, 
using this job autonomy indicator reduces the size of the sample to 1,835 individuals from 129 
home countries. 
Main Independent Variable—My main independent variable is the degree to which 
corruption is institutionalized in the home countries of the migrants in my sample. The specific 
measure that I use is the Control of Corruption measure from the WGI project, which captures 
“perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 6). I recode this measure so that higher scores indicate higher 
levels of corruption in the home country. The WGI project has collected cross-country data bi-
annually since 1996 and annually since 2002. A priori, however, it is not clear that one particular 
 11 
year of observation is more representative of former residents of a country that have migrated 
abroad than another year. I thus calculate the average corruption level in the home country over 
the years covered by the ESS, 2002-2012. However, to rule out that my results are sensitive to 
the period chosen, I repeat my baseline analyses replacing this measure of the degree to which 
corruption is institutionalized in individuals’ home country with a measure of home-country 
corruption based on averages over the years prior to 2002 (1996, 1998 and 2000). 
Control Variables—Although the goal of my analysis is not to give a full account of 
individual-level differences in job autonomy, the empirical models that I estimate include a range 
of control variables. The most basic set of control variables that I include are year/wave 
dummies, standard demographic characteristics (age, age squared, and sex) and dummies for 
employment status (whether the individual is currently in paid work, unemployed and looking 
for work, unemployed and not looking for work, retired, et cetera). Inclusion of home-country 
dummies further controls for direct effects of host-country environment on job autonomy and 
helps rule out that a negative relationship between home-country corruption and job autonomy is 
due to a sorting effect of individuals from relatively corrupt home countries migrating to host 
countries with relatively low levels of job autonomy. Other factors that I control for are 
differences in total number of hours normally worked in a week and differences in educational 
background, specifically the total number of years of fulltime education that an individual has 
and the highest education level achieved as measured by the International Standard Classification 
of Education (e.g., “less than lower secondary,” “lower secondary,” or “higher tertiary 
education”). Given that my sample consists of people that are living abroad as migrants, I further 
control for time spent in the host country (five years or less; six to 10 years; 11 to 20 years; more 
than 20 years) and the language spoken at home, specifically whether the language of the host 
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country is also the main language spoken at home or not (1=yes; 0=no). 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
To complete my standard set of control variables I include several measures of 
characteristics of the home-host country dyad to which an individual belongs (see Van Hoorn, 
2016). Specifically, I add three dummy variables to control for three features of the relationship 
between the home and the host country of the individual. The first dummy variable captures 
whether the host country has the same official language as the home country has (1=yes; 0=no). 
The second dummy variable captures whether the host country is a former colonizer of the home 
country (1=yes; 0=no). The third dummy variable captures whether the home and the host 
country are contiguous (1=yes; 0=no). Data for these dyadic measures come from the famous 
CEPII GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago 2011). 
Complementing the above set of possible confounders, for my robustness checks I 
consider five additional control variables that speak to possible alternative explanations for an 
effect of home-country corruption on migrant employees’ job autonomy. The first of these 
variables concerns individuals’ income. The ESS asks respondents about the total net income of 
their household and classifies their answer on a scale depicting different income brackets. In its 
first three waves (2002-2006), the ESS used a 12-point scale, while the last three waves used a 
10-point scale. To ensure that measured income is comparable over time and across respondents 
from different countries, I follow Van Hoorn (2016) and recode answers to create a measure of 
rank income. Hence, for each respondent, I calculate their income percentile relative to 
respondents from the same country surveyed in the same year/wave. 
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The second additional control variable that I consider is individuals’ self-reported 
happiness. The ESS measures individuals’ happiness using the following item: “Taking all things 
together, how happy would you say you are?” Respondents can answer on a Likert-type scale 
that ranges from 0, “extremely unhappy” to 10, “extremely happy.” 
The third additional control variable is actually a set of two variables that captures 
individuals’ preferences or values. Values speak to people’s deepest motivations, the importance 
they attach to certain objectives compared to other objectives, and provide cross-situational 
guidance to individuals when selecting between alternative courses of action or states of affairs 
(Rohan 2000). The personal values that I consider derive from the framework of universal 
human values developed by Shalom Schwartz and collaborators (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and 
Bilsky 1987, 1990), which is the standard values framework in psychology. Specifically, I 
consider the two-overarching values dimensions in this framework, so-called openness-to-change 
versus conservation values and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values. A high score 
on openness-to-change versus conservation indicates that an individual attaches relatively much 
value to hedonism, stimulation and self-direction and relatively little value to tradition, 
conformity and security. A high score on self-transcendence versus self-enhancement indicates 
that an individual attaches relatively much value to universalism and benevolence and relatively 
little value to power and achievement. Details on the ESS items—21 in total—and the procedure 
used to measures these two values dimensions are presented in Schwartz et al. (2001) and are 
available on request as well. 
The fourth additional control variable concerns the industry in which respondents work, 
specifically the average level of job autonomy in the industry. Across its six waves, the ESS has 
recorded the industry in which respondents work using different revisions of the ISIC 
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(International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities). My measure of 
average job autonomy involves averaging across each industry thus included and combining the 
resulting scores in a single industry autonomy measure. 
Finally, as the last of the five additional control variables, I consider the level of 
economic development of migrant employees’ home country. The specific measure that I use is 
GDP per capita, as available from the World Bank World Development Indicators database 
(World Bank 2015). I follow the same procedure as for measuring home-country corruption, 
meaning that I calculate the average level of per-capita income in the home country over the 
years covered by the ESS, 2002-2012. 
 
B. Method 
To test my hypothesis, I estimate the following model: 
 
imim2m10im εXβCββA +++= .       (1) 
 
In this model Aim indicates the amount of job autonomy granted to individual i that is born in 
home country m, Cm denotes the degree to which corruption is institutionalized in the 
individual’s home country, Xim is a set of control variables (year/wave fixed effects, host country 
fixed effects, age, gender, et cetera) and εim is a random error term. My hypothesis is confirmed if 
the coefficient for home-country corruption (β1) is statistically significantly negative. 
I estimate Equation 1 using OLS, implicitly assuming that job autonomy is measured on a 
cardinal scale. However, as mentioned above, my results may be sensitive to the assumption of 
cardinality so that I also present results using ordered probit estimation. More importantly, my 
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data are clustered with individuals nested in home countries, meaning that for all models I use 
robust standard errors that are clustered at the home-country level. Finally, the home-country 
subsamples in my analysis have highly unequal size with some subsamples containing very few 
individual observations. Hence, to assess the robustness of my baseline results, I also check 
whether I obtain similar results when considering only home-country subsamples with a pre-
specified minimum number of individual observations. 
 
III. Results 
A. Baseline Results 
To start, I test how much variation in job autonomy occurs between different home 
countries compared to between individuals from the same home country. Variance components 
analysis finds that 6.04% (95% CI: 4.28%-8.31%) of total variation in job autonomy occurs 
between home countries instead of between individuals within their respective home countries. 
Hence, specific features of individuals’ home country indeed seem to have a significant influence 
on how much autonomy these individuals are granted by their employers, even though 
substantial individual-level heterogeneity exists as well (cf. Table A.1 in the appendix). 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Table 2 presents the results of my baseline analysis. Confirming my hypothesis, results 
reveal a strong, statistically highly significant negative correlation between home-country 
corruption and the amount of job autonomy an individual has (Model 2). Moreover, the effect of 
home-country corruption on foreign-born employees’ job autonomy appears quite large. Adding 
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home-country corruption as a predictor can increase variance explained by more than 1.5 
percentage points (Model 2 versus Model 1). Inclusion of some further control variables such as 
years of education or time spent in the host country lowers the coefficient for home-country 
corruption but the relationship is still highly statistically significant (Models 3 and 4). Moreover, 
the effect of home-country corruption remains quite large when compared to the effects of some 
other predictors of job autonomy. The effect of a one standard deviation decrease in home-
country corruption is roughly equal to the effect of using the host-country language as the main 
language at home, for instance. Similarly, the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase/decrease in home-country corruption is not substantially smaller than the effect of a one 
standard deviation increase/decrease in years of education (Models 3 and 4). 
 
B. Robustness Checks 
Omitted Variable Bias and Alternative Explanations—Although the models estimated 
above control for such factors as years of education, language spoken and time spent in the host 
country, the main concern with my baseline results is the possibility of an omitted variable bias. 
Hence, for my first set of robustness checks I seek to reduce the potential for a spurious 
correlation between home-country corruption and job autonomy by controlling for a variety of 
additional factors that might correlate with both these variables and could offer an alternative 
explanation for the observed relationship between home-country corruption and job autonomy. 
The additional control variables that I consider are individuals’ income, self-reported happiness, 
personal values, average job autonomy in the industry, and home-country level of economic 
development (see above). The rationale for including each of these five variables is as follows. 
First, following the standard signaling perspective and theories of statistical 
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discrimination (Arrow 1973; Spence 1974), there is a concern that home-country corruption does 
not inform employers about individuals’ trustworthiness but about some other unobservable 
factor that would be taken into account by any employer deciding on how much autonomy to 
grant to a particular employee. The most prominent such unobserved factor would be an 
employee’s ability, which, in turn, may affect job autonomy because the specialization and 
efficiency benefits of delegation and autonomy are greater, the more able the employee is. 
Accordingly, I include income—specifically income rank (see above)—as an additional variable 
that proxies for an unobserved ability factor (Van Hoorn 2016). During their employment reign, 
employers can get a clear sense of employees’ skills and capabilities and adjust their wages 
accordingly, making individuals’ income a powerful proxy for their ability. If the negative 
relationship between corruption and job autonomy continues to hold with personal income rank 
controlled for, it seems unlikely that unobserved systematic differences in ability or skills 
between individuals from different home countries account for this relationship. 
Second, there is a concern that both the measure of home-country corruption and the 
measure of job autonomy might be affected by the particular way in which individuals born and 
socialized in certain countries perceive the world. Because of social conventions or cultural 
norms, individuals may exhibit an upward or downward bias when asked to evaluate and score 
either their own lives or the environment in which they are living. Following Van Hoorn (2016), 
I include self-reported happiness as an additional control variable to address this contingency, as 
this variable seems most influenced by such differences in response style. If differences in 
response style, specifically the tendency to be overly negative or overly positive when making a 
subjective evaluation, truly explain the relationship between home-country corruption and job 
autonomy, I expect this relationship to vanish when self-reported happiness is controlled for. If 
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the effect of home-country corruption on job autonomy remains with self-reported happiness 
controlled for, it seems unlikely that the found relationship between corruption and job autonomy 
is spurious, driven by systematic differences in response style. 
Third, personal values concern individuals’ deepest motivations and preferences, which, 
in turn, can affect how much job autonomy people end up having. So far, I have grounded my 
analysis in the idea that employers rely on specific signals of (un)trustworthiness when deciding 
how much job autonomy to grant to an employee, particularly to employees from different home 
countries. This perspective is one-sided, however, as it neglects the possibility that individuals 
from different home countries may simply have different value preferences, meaning that 
individuals born in certain countries attach much less value to job autonomy than individuals 
from other home countries do. If people from home countries in which corruption is more 
institutionalized also care less about job autonomy, the effect of home-country corruption on job 
autonomy could be spurious, reflecting a simple difference in preferences rather than a process 
of employers relying on signals of trustworthiness to determine how much autonomy to grant to 
specific employees. Controlling for differences in personal values—specifically individuals’ 
scores on the two overarching values dimensions in the standard framework of universal human 
values (Schwartz 1992)—enables me to rule out such a preference-based explanation for the 
observed relationship between home-country corruption and job autonomy. 
Fourth, the average level of job autonomy in an industry reflects the nature of a job, 
independent from specific features of one’s home country giving rise to differential managerial 
treatment. My analysis focuses on the direct effect of inferred trustworthiness on the amount of 
autonomy that an employer grants to different employees. Alternatively, inferred trustworthiness 
may influence recruitment, as when only employees that are deemed trustworthy are hired to 
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work in high-autonomy industries, while employees that are deemed (relatively) untrustworthy 
end up working in low-autonomy industries. If so, home-country corruption may affect 
individuals’ autonomy via inferred trustworthiness, but through a different channel than is the 
focus of this paper. Controlling for average job autonomy in individuals’ industry allows me to 
check whether the observed relationship between home-country corruption and job autonomy is 
perhaps due to such an indirect selection effect or due to the direct effect emphasized in this 
paper. 
Fifth and finally, there is a possible concern that home-country corruption correlates with 
other home-country characteristics that employers are likely to take into account when deciding 
on how much autonomy to grant to an employee. Van Hoorn (2016), for instance, finds that 
employers grant more autonomy to individuals from more economically advanced home 
countries because these individuals appear more competent and would therefore benefit more 
from having autonomy at work than individuals from less advanced economies would. If so, the 
corruption-autonomy relationship found in my baseline analysis may be spurious, reflecting the 
autonomy effect of home-country economic development, which, in turn, correlates with home-
country level of corruption. However, if the relationship between home-country corruption and 
autonomy remains with home-country economic development controlled for, it seems likely that 
host-country corruption indeed acts as a signal of (un)trustworthiness that employers rely on 
when deciding how much autonomy to grant to specific groups of employees. 
Although each of these five additional control variables speak to potential omitted 
variables and alternative explanations for the found effect of home-country corruption on job 
autonomy, to complete the above discussion let me note that there are strong arguments against 
considering these variables as control variables. Specifically, the concern is that inclusion of 
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these variables increases the risk of a Type II error (which, in turn, provides a powerful rationale 
for not considering these variables as part of my initial analyses, but only as a strict check of the 
robustness of the corruption-autonomy relation uncovered in the baseline analysis). This risk 
appears particularly prominent in case of personal income and self-reported happiness, as these 
variables are also outcome variables in their own right. Indeed, it seems likely that a process 
highly similar to the process by which decision makers are led to grant more job autonomy to 
individuals from some home countries than to individuals from other home countries also affects 
migrants’ personal income or subjective well-being (Van Hoorn 2016).3 For the other three 
additional control variables, this problem would be less relevant. Still, though, corruption is 
likely to have a causal effect on economic development, which could mean that controlling for 
home-country economic development dilutes the variation in job autonomy that is attributed to 
home-country corruption. Similarly, personal values are strongly affected by the culture of one’s 
home country, including such dimensions of culture as power distance that are known to be 
                                                 
3
 Job autonomy could even be a mediator in that home-country corruption has a negative effect 
on individuals’ income partly because individuals are granted less autonomy at work, which, in 
turn, limits their ability to make optimal use of their unique experience and tacit skills and 
knowhow. Similarly, migrants from home countries in which corruption is more pervasive have 
less job autonomy compared to immigrants from home countries in which corruption is more 
pervasive may end up less happy because having relatively little autonomy at work makes their 
jobs less pleasant and interesting. Lang and Lehmann (2012) survey the literature on ethnicity-
based income differentials. 
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related to corruption (Hofstede 2001; Licht et al. 2007).4 Finally, I should note that, while 
personal income and home-country development might proxy for an unobserved ability factor, 
honesty and reliability are probably chief among the qualities captured in such a broad measure 
of individuals’ ability.5 Overall, I thus deem it wise to warn explicitly that controlling for such 
factors as individuals’ income or self-reported happiness can help limit potential biases due to 
omitted variables and rule out alternative explanations for my findings, but that the coefficients 
for home-country corruption obtained with these control variables included are likely to end up 
having a downward bias. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
This being said, Table 3 presents the results for the analyses including individuals’ 
income, self-reported happiness, personal values, average job autonomy in the industry or home-
country level of economic development as additional control variables. Consistent with the 
above arguments, most of the five additional variables are statistically significant correlates of 
job autonomy. Income rank, for instance, correlates strongly positively with job autonomy, 
                                                 
4
 For evidence on the cultural component of corruption, which is not reflected in formal 
governance structures but institutionalized in societal conventions and cultural norms, see 
Fisman and Miguel (2007). 
5
 Given that my analysis already controls for such skill measures as years of education and level 
of education, I expect honesty and reliability to be even more prominent components of 
unobserved ability in my analysis than they would be in analyses that include fewer such 
controls. 
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which is consistent with the idea that, ceteris paribus, individuals with more autonomy at their 
jobs are able to achieve higher productivity levels and therefore get paid more. Most importantly, 
however, in all cases, home-country corruption continues to have a statistically highly significant 
negative effect on job autonomy. Hence, even though controlling for, say, personal income might 
be inappropriate from a theoretical perspective, my baseline results survive also this very 
stringent way of assessing the potential spuriousness of and alternative explanations for the 
found effect of home-country corruption on job autonomy. Effect sizes are clearly smaller than 
before (cf. Model 4 in Table 2), but this is as expected and of course also consistent with 
theoretical arguments concerning the direct and indirect effects of home-country corruption on 
individuals’ income, happiness and personal values, among others. 
Minimum Number of Individual Observations per Home-Country Subsample—As stated, 
the home-country subsamples in my analysis are of differing size and some home-country 
subsamples comprise relatively few individual observations. To address this issue and eliminate 
potential biases, I first repeat my baseline analysis using bootstrapping procedures to obtain 
estimates for my standard errors. Results using bootstrapping are almost identical to my baseline 
results (details available on request). However, as the main check of the potential sensitivity of 
my results to the small size of some of the home-country subsamples, I repeat my baseline 
analysis excluding home countries that do not have a minimum number of individual 
observations (cf. Table A.1 in the appendix). In all cases, results are almost exactly the same as 
my baseline results, showing no sign of biases (Models 11-13 in Table 4). 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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Alternative Dependent and Independent Variables—As a further robustness check, I 
consider whether my baseline results are sensitive to the particular dependent and independent 
variable used. First, I substitute the standard job autonomy measure with a measure of 
individuals’ discretion in setting the time at which they start/finish their work. Results confirm 
the effect of home-country corruption on job autonomy, even when it concerns employees’ 
discretion in the rather narrow domain of starting and finishing their work on a particular time 
(Model 14 in Table 4). Results are similarly unaffected when using an alternative measure of 
home-country corruption, based on data covering the period 1996-2000 instead of the period 
2002-2012 (Model 15 in Table 4). 
Alternative Estimation Methods—As a final robustness check, I consider whether my 
results are sensitive to the non-cardinal nature of the job autonomy measure. My analyses so far 
have assumed that job autonomy is in fact measured on a cardinal scale, which, in turn, may have 
affected my results. However, using ordered probit estimation to account for the scale of the job 
autonomy measure renders results that are highly similar to results from my baseline analysis 
(Model 16 in Table 4). Hence, there is no evidence that treating job autonomy as a cardinal 
measure introduces biases. 
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has sought to unpack the black box of trust shaping workplace organization. 
Although the possible role of trust in providing governance to workplace organization is widely 
recognized, for practical reasons, in empirical studies this idea has been watered down to testing 
the relationship between a measure of trust as the independent variable and some feature of 
workplace organization as the dependent variable. Notably, there are several studies showing that 
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stronger societal trust norms increase the amount of job autonomy that employers grant to their 
employees, which is an understandable simplification from a practical perspective. As is, we lack 
insight on the deeper process underlying employers’ ultimate trust or autonomy decision, 
however. 
Trust decisions involve not only a willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of the other 
party but also an assessment of the counterparty’s trustworthiness. For my unpacking of the 
trust-organization nexus, I have analyzed this latter feature of the decision to trust, using job 
autonomy as the dependent variable. When it comes to trustworthiness and job autonomy, the 
key challenge that employers face is to make an informed decision about which employees can 
be trusted with higher amounts of autonomy and which employees need to be monitored and 
controlled more closely. Prior work, particularly theories of signaling and statistical 
discrimination, have argued the power of signals in informing decision makers. Similarly, 
laboratory studies have found that even simple informational cues can affect trustors’ behavior in 
experimental trust games. Building on these bodies of research, I proposed that employers take 
into account group-level traits as a way of inferring trustworthiness and, ultimately, deciding on 
how much job autonomy to grant to specific employee groups. I tested this proposition 
empirically in the context of migrants originating from different home countries and using the 
degree to which corruption has been institutionalized in these home countries as a signal of 
individuals’ (un)trustworthiness. Specifically, I tested whether immigrants from home countries 
in which corruption is more pervasive, on average, have less job autonomy compared to 
immigrants from home countries in which corruption is less pervasive. In a cross-national sample 
comprising 9,150 migrants from 157 home countries, I found strong support for this hypothesis. 
Extensive robustness checks ruled out alternative explanations for these findings, for instance, 
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unobserved skill differences. Overall, this paper contributes important real-world evidence on 
process-oriented features of trust governing exchange in the context of workplace organization. 
In addition, the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates how home-country characteristics 
can be an important determinant of how migrant employees are treated and their ability to 
integrate successfully in their places of work. 
These contributions notwithstanding, there are also several limitations to the analysis 
presented in this paper. First, this paper has not studied individual employers and their actual 
trust and autonomy decisions. Rather, this paper has focused on outcomes of trust decisions and 
patterns in the data consistent with a particular process by which employers decide how much 
autonomy to grant to specific employees. Accordingly, the analysis remains indirect, which, in 
turn, leaves more room for confounding influences than, for instance, a laboratory experiment 
would leave. I do not think that confounding influences do, in fact, bias my results, given the 
various alternative explanations and control variables considered. Moreover, the indirect 
approach has some clear advantages over laboratory experiments that focus on individual 
decision makers, as the results provide direct evidence on individuals’ real-world experiences 
and, as such, do not suffer low external and ecological validity. Laboratory experiments could be 
helpful, however, for probing deeper in the process of inferring trustworthiness, including 
analyses of the weight that employers assign to different employee signals and group-level traits. 
A second limitation is that the social groups (i.e., migrants from different home countries) 
and the group-level trait empirically analyzed in this paper have been rather narrow. Although I 
cannot see any reason why the underlying mechanism of relying on group-level traits to infer 
trustworthiness would not generalize to other social groups, a logical avenue for future research 
is to extent the analysis presented here to consider other types of groups in society and other 
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salient group-level traits. 
Finally, it has been beyond the scope of the present analysis to link the evidence on 
group-level traits shaping employers’ decisions of how much autonomy to grant to specific 
employees to organizational performance. A generic concern with statistical discrimination is 
that it leads to suboptimal allocation decisions, since a consequence of considering groups as a 
whole is that specific qualities of some employees remain underappreciated. For job autonomy, 
we expect the same outcome of many employees being granted less autonomy than would be 
optimal in terms of maximizing the net sum of efficiency gains due to specialization minus the 
costs of shirking. However, future work is needed to assess the actual performance consequences 
of biased managerial treatment on the count of group-level inferences concerning employees’ 
trustworthiness. This paper, then, provides a stepping stone towards studying this and other 
important features of trust as a provider of governance in the context of workplace organization. 
 
Appendix 
 
 
<Insert Table A.1 about here> 
 
 
<Insert Table A.2 about here> 
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
Variable Mean and standard deviation 
Dependent variable  
Job autonomy (0-10) [n=9,156] 5.45       (3.55) 
Decide time start/finish work (1, Not at all true – 4, Very true) [n=1,848] 1.81       (1.06) 
Main independent variable  
Home-country corruption level (0-5) 2.38       (1.04) 
Selected control variables  
Gender (1=male) 45.3%       (49.8%) 
Age in years 47.4       (16.4) 
Years of full-time education completed 12.9       (4.35) 
Total hours normally worked per week in main job overtime included 39.3       (13.1) 
Host-country language spoken at home (1=yes) 60.3%       (48.9%) 
Host country has same official language as home country (1=yes) 25.9%       (43.8%) 
Host country is former colonizer of home country (1=yes) 23.6%       (42.5%) 
Host country is contiguous to home country (1=yes) 30.1%       (45.9%) 
Home-country economic development (average GDP per capita in 2005US$) 13,566       (15,108) 
Rank income (percentile) 46.5       (27.7) 
Happiness (0-10) 7.19       (2.02) 
Openness-to-change versus conservation values (-5,5) -.395       (1.14) 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (-5,5) 1.24       (1.09) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations is 9,618 unless otherwise indicated. Sample covers individuals 
originating from 157 different home countries. 
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Table 2—The Effect of Home-Country Corruption on the Job Autonomy of Foreign-Born 
Individuals 
Dependent = Job autonomy Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Home-country corruption level - -.152*** (.014) 
-.119*** 
(.010) 
-.102*** 
(.011) 
Gender (1=male) .005 (.028) 
.016 
(.028) 
.005 
(.025) 
.010 
(.024) 
Years of education - - .134*** (.016) 
.133*** 
(.017) 
Hours worked per week - - .060*** (.008) 
.060*** 
(.009) 
Host-country language spoken at home 
(1=yes) - - - 
.090*** 
(.024) 
Host country has same official language 
as home country (1=yes) - - - 
.071* 
(.036) 
Host country is former colonizer of home 
country (1=yes) - - - 
.001 
(.033) 
Host country neighbors home country 
(1=yes) - - - 
.002 
(.032) 
Dummies for time spent in host country No No No Yes 
Dummies for education level No No Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Host-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 9,150 9,150 9,150 9,150 
No. of home countries 157 157 157 157 
R2 .0999 .1154 .1796 .1854 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the home-country level. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 3—Results with Additional Control Variables 
Dependent = Job autonomy Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Home-country corruption level -.087*** (.010) 
-.095*** 
(.011) 
-.081*** 
(.010) 
-.095*** 
(.011) 
-.094*** 
(.018) 
-.056*** 
(.016) 
Income rank .107*** (.012) - - - - 
.089*** 
(.011) 
Self-reported happiness - .089*** (.010) - - - 
.075*** 
(.011) 
Self-transcendence versus self-
enhancement values - - 
.014 
(.013) - - 
.005 
(.013) 
Openness-to-change versus 
conservation values - - 
.128*** 
(.010) - - 
.122*** 
(.010) 
Average job autonomy in industry - - - .126*** (.010) - 
.121*** 
(.009) 
Home-country economic 
development (log of per-capita GDP) - - - - 
.010 
(.016) 
-.000 
(.016) 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 9,150 9,150 9,150 9,150 9,150 9,150 
No. of home countries 157 157 157 157 157 157 
R2 .1942 .1922 .1977 .1988 .1854 .2232 
Notes: See Table 2. All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the home-country level. 
Standard control variables are gender, age and age squared, dummies for employment status, years of education, dummies for 
education level, hours worked per week, dummy for host-country language spoken at home, dummy for home and host country having 
same official language, dummy for home and host country having past colonial relationship, dummy for home and host country 
contiguity, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 4—Robustness Checks Using Minimum Home-Country Subsample Size and Alternative Variables and Estimation Method 
 
Minimum number of individual observations per 
home-country subsample 
Alternative 
dependent 
variable: 
Decide time 
start/finish 
work 
Alternative 
independent 
variable 
Alternative 
estimation 
method: 
Ordered probit  Minimum 2 Minimum 10 Minimum 50 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Home-country corruption 
level 
-.103*** 
(.011) 
-.104*** 
(.011) 
-.110*** 
(.011) 
-.075** 
(.030) - 
-.113*** 
(.013) 
Home-country corruption 
between 1996 & 2000 - - - - 
-.100*** 
(.012) - 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable 
standardized Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No, original 0-
10 scale 
No. of observations 9.135 8,920 7,703 1,848 9,138 9,150 
No. of home countries 142 98 48 132 154 157 
R2 1851 .1855 .1879 .1580 .1851 - 
Pseudo R2 - - - - - .0399 
Notes: See Table 2. Home-country corruption is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the home-country level. Standard control variables are gender, age and age 
squared, dummies for employment status, years of education, dummies for education level, hours worked per week, dummy for host-
country language spoken at home, dummy for home and host country having same official language, dummy for home and host 
country having past colonial relationship, dummy for home and host country contiguity, host-country dummies, and year/wave 
dummies. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table A.1—Home Countries in the Sample 
Home country Average job autonomy in host country (0-10) 
Home-country 
corruption (0-5) 
No. of individual 
observations 
Russia 4.97     (3.71) 3.43 1,068 
Germany 6.77     (3.12) 0.70 466 
Poland 4.93     (3.57) 2.17 431 
Morocco 5.35     (3.67) 2.79 350 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.84     (3.54) 2.82 347 
Romania 5.07     (3.74) 2.73 303 
Turkey 4.53     (3.56) 2.56 299 
Ukraine 5.41     (3.42) 3.38 294 
Italy 5.51     (3.65) 2.22 275 
France 6.81     (3.19) 1.10 261 
Portugal 4.82     (3.71) 1.45 255 
United Kingdom 6.28     (3.07) 0.72 242 
Finland 7.25     (2.80) 0.12 189 
Albania 2.11     (2.91) 3.17 144 
Croatia 5.83     (3.56) 2.44 143 
Kazakhstan 3.85     (3.38) 3.46 131 
Belarus 4.67     (3.73) 3.21 129 
India 6.31     (2.76) 2.95 127 
Netherlands 7.20     (3.00) 0.38 116 
Iran 5.65     (3.27) 3.10 115 
Spain 6.43     (3.22) 1.35 115 
Algeria 5.47     (3.49) 3.07 114 
Iraq 5.29     (3.62) 3.90 112 
Slovak Republic 4.50     (3.62) 2.24 94 
Czech Republic 5.87     (3.42) 2.18 90 
Austria 6.46     (3.39) 0.64 87 
Bulgaria 4.51     (3.74) 2.65 83 
Brazil 5.14     (3.48) 2.53 81 
United States 6.86     (3.33) 1.01 81 
Ireland 6.17     (2.95) 0.91 76 
Hungary 6.56     (3.33) 2.03 71 
Pakistan 4.94     (3.34) 3.44 70 
Sweden 7.33     (2.70) 0.27 70 
Tunisia 5.22     (3.79) 2.49 69 
Denmark 7.43     (2.60) 0.05 63 
Suriname 5.75     (3.19) 2.62 63 
Belgium 6.90     (2.96) 1.10 62 
Georgia 4.20     (3.92) 2.81 61 
Uzbekistan 5.26     (3.71) 3.59 61 
Ecuador 5.80     (3.34) 3.31 60 
Latvia 5.00     (3.03) 2.34 60 
Indonesia 5.68     (3.26) 3.29 57 
Lithuania 5.04     (3.40) 2.32 57 
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Table A.1—Ctd. 
Home country Average job autonomy in host country (0-10) 
Home-country 
corruption (0-5) 
No. of individual 
observations 
Philippines 5.60     (3.34) 3.16 57 
Argentina 6.13     (3.21) 2.95 56 
Macedonia FYR 4.80     (3.66) 2.82 51 
Nigeria 4.42     (3.34) 3.61 50 
Moldova 5.09     (3.28) 3.20 47 
Colombia 5.50     (3.59) 2.74 46 
Sri Lanka 4.64     (3.55) 2.76 45 
Ethiopia 5.77     (3.13) 3.18 43 
Greece 4.67     (3.94) 2.33 43 
Norway 7.55     (2.44) 0.43 42 
Chile 5.79     (3.25) 1.08 39 
Estonia 6.10     (3.14) 1.61 39 
Peru 6.21     (3.35) 2.78 39 
Syria 4.87     (3.87) 3.39 39 
South Africa 5.97     (3.33) 2.25 38 
Vietnam 4.97     (3.61) 3.14 38 
Angola 4.44     (3.33) 3.80 36 
Egypt. 5.15     (4.19) 3.05 34 
Lebanon 5.44     (3.78) 3.24 34 
Cape Verde 4.82     (3.39) 1.89 33 
China 4.88     (3.12) 3.05 32 
Congo, Republic 4.35     (3.77) 3.54 31 
Thailand 5.74     (3.66) 2.78 31 
Yemen 4.90     (3.84) 3.43 30 
Azerbaijan 3.79     (3.31) 3.56 29 
Armenia 4.35     (3.24) 3.11 26 
Afghanistan 5.09     (3.93) 4.01 22 
Congo, Democratic Republic 5.14     (3.48) 3.86 22 
Kenya 7.38     (2.38) 3.45 21 
Kyrgyzstan 4.62     (3.87) 3.61 21 
Bolivia 5.60     (3.22) 3.12 20 
Jamaica 6.05     (3.78) 2.95 20 
Canada 6.32     (3.40) 0.51 19 
Ghana 5.74     (2.49) 2.60 19 
Libya 3.63     (3.64) 3.54 19 
Australia 7.82     (2.72) 0.49 17 
Mauritius 6.24     (3.54) 2.00 17 
Slovenia 4.88     (3.37) 1.59 17 
Switzerland 8.06     (2.25) 0.39 17 
Iceland 7.20     (2.68) 0.32 15 
Senegal 3.60     (3.54) 2.82 15 
Uruguay 6.00     (3.68) 1.42 15 
Cuba 4.79     (3.24) 2.18 14 
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Home country Average job autonomy in host country (0-10) 
Home-country 
corruption (0-5) 
No. of individual 
observations 
Eritrea 4.50     (3.59) 2.82 14 
Tajikistan 4.79     (2.81) 3.58 14 
Korea, Rep. 6.54     (2.90) 2.06 13 
Bangladesh 5.00     (2.86) 3.67 12 
Cameroon 5.00     (3.62) 3.53 12 
Paraguay 4.83     (3.41) 3.60 12 
Venezuela 5.08     (3.00) 3.57 12 
Dominican Republic 5.27     (3.47) 3.15 11 
Côte d’Ivoire 5.00     (2.58) 3.56 10 
Cyprus 5.20     (4.44) 1.43 10 
Japan 4.60     (4.12) 1.19 10 
Uganda 4.00     (2.94) 3.35 10 
Madagascar 7.33     (2.92) 2.65 9 
Mexico 6.78     (2.05) 2.79 9 
Malaysia 6.88     (2.64) 2.29 8 
Mozambique 6.50     (3.07) 3.01 8 
New Zealand 5.88     (3.60) 0.14 8 
Tanzania 6.00     (2.67) 3.08 8 
Zimbabwe 6.00     (3.12) 3.80 8 
Cambodia 5.86     (2.12) 3.62 7 
Greenland 5.57     (3.87) 1.30 7 
Israel 8.00     (2.58) 1.62 7 
Nepal 5.43     (2.64) 3.14 7 
Rwanda 4.43     (3.87) 2.56 7 
Singapore 6.86     (2.67) 0.26 7 
Sudan 4.14     (3.34) 3.79 7 
Gambia 3.00     (2.76) 3.10 6 
Guinea 5.00     (4.29) 3.50 6 
São Tomé and Principe 4.67     (4.27) 2.99 6 
Togo 5.67     (3.67) 3.44 6 
Honduras 3.40     (4.77) 3.33 5 
Hong Kong (SAR China) 5.80     (3.11) 0.63 5 
Jordan 7.80     (1.79) 2.29 5 
Aruba 7.50     (1.73) 1.30 4 
Burundi 7.00     (3.56) 3.57 4 
El Salvador 3.25     (3.59) 2.84 4 
Guatemala 3.50     (3.51) 3.08 4 
Lao 3.50     (4.51) 3.71 4 
Turkmenistan 8.25     (1.50) 3.88 4 
Brunei Darussalam 5.33     (4.73) 1.98 3 
Burkina Faso 7.00     (2.00) 2.77 3 
Guinea-Bissau 6.00     (3.46) 3.57 3 
Guyana 4.67     (4.62) 3.06 3 
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Home-country 
corruption (0-5) 
No. of individual 
observations 
Haiti 4.33     (5.13) 3.88 3 
Kuwait 4.00     (4.36) 1.94 3 
Maldives 8.00     (2.00) 2.95 3 
Nicaragua 7.67     (2.52) 3.14 3 
Saudi Arabia 6.00     (3.46) 2.63 3 
Trinidad and Tobago 8.00     (1.00) 2.72 3 
Zambia 8.33     (1.53) 3.12 3 
Benin 5.50     (2.12) 3.18 2 
Chad 0.50     (0.71) 3.79 2 
Comoros 1.00     (1.41) 3.26 2 
Grenada 9.50     (0.71) 1.99 2 
Macao (SAR China) 3.50     (4.95) 2.00 2 
Malta 9.00     (0.00) 1.57 2 
Belize 0 2.72 1 
Dominica 0 1.84 1 
Equatorial Guinea 5 4.03 1 
Gabon 8 3.25 1 
Liberia 7 3.27 1 
Luxembourg 9 0.54 1 
Mongolia 5 3.02 1 
Namibia 8 2.27 1 
Niger 10 3.28 1 
Panama 7 2.82 1 
Papua New Guinea 8 3.64 1 
Puerto Rico 9 1.71 1 
St. Kitts And Nevis 5 1.69 1 
Timor-Leste 6 3.32 1 
United Arab Emirates 1 1.44 1 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A.2—Construct Validity of the Job Autonomy Measure 
Description of construct related to job autonomy Average job autonomy (0-10) 
Current job: can decide time start/finish work    
1 Not at all true 4.96 (SD=3.49) [n=21,113] 
2 A little true 6.43 (SD=2.91) [n=7,899] 
3 Quite true 7.39 (SD=2.57) [n=5,547] 
4 Very true 8.23 (SD=2.45) [n=4,549] 
Current job: there is a lot of variety in my work    
Very true 7.19 (SD=3.03) [n=12,754] 
Quite true 6.16 (SD=3.15) [n=13,259] 
A little true 4.94 (SD=3.30) [n=9,382] 
Not at all true 3.82 (SD=3.62) [n=3,752] 
Current job: health/safety at risk because of work    
Very true 5.21 (SD=3.69) [n=2,942] 
Quite true 5.23 (SD=3.45) [n=5,091] 
A little true 5.84 (SD=3.31) [n=11,497] 
Not at all true 6.39 (SD=3.28) [n=19,433] 
Employment relation    
Self-employed 9.14 (SD=1.95) [n=23,946] 
Employee 5.52 (SD=3.52) [n=206,853] 
Working for own family business 7.96 (SD=2.81) [n=3,454] 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets. Source is 
author’s own calculations based on data from Waves 1-6 of the European Social Survey (ESS). 
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